ABSTRACT Recent years have witnessed that the new mobility Intelligent Transportation System is booming, especially the development of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). It brings convenience and a good experience for drivers. Unfortunately, VANETs are suffering from potential security and privacy issues due to the inherent openness of VANETs. In the past few years, to address security and privacy-preserving problems, many identity-based privacy-preserving authentication schemes have been proposed by researchers. However, we found that these schemes fail to meet the requirements of user privacy protection and are vulnerable to attacks or have high computational complexity. Hence, we focus on enhancing privacy-preserving via authentication and achieving better performance. In this paper, first, we describe the vulnerabilities of the previous scheme. Furthermore, to enhance privacy protection and achieve better performance, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for secure V2V communication in VANETs. Through security analysis and comparison, we formally demonstrate that our scheme can accomplish security goals under dynamic topographical scenario compared with the previous scheme. Finally, the efficiency of the scheme is showed by performance evaluation. The results of our proposed scheme are computationally efficient compared with the previously proposed privacy-preserving authentication scheme.
communicate in the VANETs environment which exists security threats. It is possible that these valuable data may be stolen by the adversary in the above communication process. That's why mobile users, researchers even governments pay greater attention to security issues to achieve better implement of real-time and intelligent applications [6] .
There are two different communication scenarios, namely Vehicle To Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle To Vehicle (V2V) in VANETs. As shown in Figure 1 , there are three major units in VANETs, which are the authentication server (AS), wireless onboard unit (OBU) and roadside unit (RSU). Vehicles in VANETs are deemed as mobile nodes equipped with OBUs with an integration of the GPS receiver, ITS-G5/IEEE 802.11p protocols, and vehicular sensors [7] . The OBU is in charge of recording information (e.g., velocity, location) during driving and allows itself to correspond with RSU or other vehicles. The RSU is fixed at the roadsides and plays itself as public transport infrastructure to connect the vehicle to the Internet through reliable communication channels. Further, because of equipping with wireless devices, RSU can exchange information with passing vehicles and gather information to know about local situations [8] . Due to above features and their inherent openness, VANETs are facing a serious security challenge, like the issues of information confidentiality, information integrity. Hence, it is becoming increasingly important for protocols to have the ability to provide drivers with secure and user friendly authentication to achieve a secure communication [9] . Owing to VANETs are vulnerable to malicious attacks just as any other wireless network [7] , [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , more and more researchers are having eye on and taking part in privacy protection authentication. Authentication protocols for VANETs have been designed by most researchers, including those put forward for offering privacy protection during the period of communication and those proposed for a reduction of the storage and computation/communication costs.
However, existing authentication protocols generally have shortcomings against the external adversary. VANETs still need a secure and effective authentication scheme. Our research aims to construct an efficient and secure authentication scheme to eliminate these vulnerabilities of Zhou et al.'s scheme under VANETs environment.
The major contributions of our improved scheme are listed as following:
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
• First, in order to enhance the security, we bring up an efficient privacy protection mutual authentication protocol for secure V2V communication in VANETs to overcome the shortcomings of Zhou et al.'s scheme.
• Second, we reveal the weakness of Zhou et al.'s scheme and give an in-depth description of the damaging threat of the existing weakness.
• Third, we present an elaborate security analysis to formally demonstrate that the proposed scheme is provable security and meet the security goals in VANETs, especially in key protection.
• Finally, we display our performance analysis to demonstrate that our scheme has a reasonable consumption with a lower computation and communication cost than the previous scheme in VANETs.
B. ROADMAP
To present our contributions and work, the rest of the framework for this paper is structured as follows. The related work in recent years is introduced in section II. We present the preliminaries to the elliptical curve cryptosystem in Section III.
In Section IV, we have a review of Zhou et al.'s scheme. In addition, section V points out its existing security vulnerabilities. The main improvement of our proposal is described in Section VI while Section VII describes the security analysis. We show the performance evaluation to demonstrate our scheme's reasonable overhead in Section VIII. At last, we provide the conclusion of the paper in last section.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to address security and privacy issue in VANETs, numerous research schemes [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , [30] [31] [32] have been proposed. Raya and Hubaux [15] investigated an authentication scheme which pre-storaged many public and private key pairs with a short lifecycle, as well as corresponding certificates into each vehicle's OBU to preserve drivers' privacy. However, a vehicle's OBU needs to store very large number key pairs due to the changing key each time. Raya and Hubaux's scheme has a high computation cost, since the key management is a complex problem.
To solve the shortcomings of Raya and Hubaux scheme, a new privacy protection protocol, which adopted an alternative approach to avoidance of the preloading of a large number of public or private key pairs of OBU and corresponding certificates was designed by Lu et al. [17] in 2008. In their scheme, when a vehicle passes through the RSU, VOLUME 7, 2019 each vehicle will receive an anonymous certificate for a short period of time. In order to obtain anonymous certificates that change over time from RSU to avoid the adversary's traceability, the vehicle needs to execute this procedure frequently. Hence, Lu et al.'s scheme with high computation/communication and storage costs has a weak efficiency. To address the weakness of Lu et al.'s scheme, a novel authentication protocol combining mix-zones with anonymous certificates was proposed by Freudiger et al. [18] . However, the scheme also must store massive anonymous certificates. Additionally, in 2008, Zhang et al. [19] designed a privacy-preserving authentication protocol with the Hash message authentication code in VANETs. In their scheme, for the sake of user's privacy, the vehicle communicates with near RSU using different public keys. Therefore, Zhang et al.'s scheme also fails to meet the requirement of performance in VANETs.
To address high computation and high storage costs problems, these schemes [25] , [26] , [30] [31] [32] were proposed. Zhang et al. [24] , [25] designed an ID-based conditional privacy protection authentication scheme in VANETs. In their scheme, both the vehicle and RSU are not necessary to store certificates. However, Lee and Lai found that [24] , [25] cannot resist replying attacks. [31] designed a conditional privacy protection authentication and group-key agreement scheme based on password for VANETs with no use bilinear pairing. References [30] , [32] proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme to improve computation efficiency. Chuang and Lee [26] proposed the first authentication mechanism (TEAM) using a transitive trust relationship for VANETs in 2014. TEAM is a quite lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme, since it only uses a hash function and an XOR operation to protect the drivers' privacy and security from malicious adversary. Vehicles are divided into three types in their scheme, that is, mistrustful vehicles (MVs), trustful vehicles (TVs) and law executors (LEs), as shown in Figure 1 . However, Kumari et al. [5] and Zhou et al. [23] revealed that Chuang and Lee's scheme suffers from privacy breach, insider attack, impersonation attack and has some other weaknesses. To address these vulnerabilities, on the basis of TEAM, Zhou et al. applied Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) to propose a new enhanced scheme which is based on mutual authentication in VANETs. Nevertheless, according to our research efforts, Zhou et al.'s scheme cannot withstand identity guessing attack and impersonation attack as well as has weaker user anonymity.
To enhance security and privacy protection in VANETs, we also use ECC technology to design a new privacypreserving authentication scheme. The formal and informal security analysis of our proposed scheme indicates its provable security and could overcome the vulnerability in Zhou et al.'s scheme. The performance analysis of our proposed scheme demonstrates that it yields lower computational and communication overheads making it applicable to dynamic topographic scenarios.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Mathematical problems in Elliptic Curve Cryptographic have been widely used in the authentication scheme in VANETs. In this paper, our proposed scheme uses the problem of elliptic curve discrete logarithm to achieve its security. The brief reviews on ECC are as follows:
Let G be an elliptic curve group, which is defined by a prime number p and a generator P. The following two difficult problem assumptions are based on ECC and these problems are difficult to solve.
Let E be an equation of the elliptic curve: y = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where a, b ∈ R Z * p . Definition 1: Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two points P and Q on E randomly, the objective of the DLP is to calculate an integer a ∈ R Z * p to meet the following condition: Q is equal to aP.
Definition 2: Elliptic Curve Computational Diffe-Hellman Problem (ECCDHP): Given two points R = aP and Q = bP on E randomly, the objective of the ECCDHP is to calculate the point abP, where a, b ∈ R Z * p are two unknown integers.
IV. REVIEW OF THE ZHOU ET AL.'s SCHEME
We review the Zhou et al.'s scheme based on TEAM for VANETs in this section. Figure 1 , vehicles have three types: first is law executors (LEs), second is trustful vehicles (TVs) and third is mistrustful vehicles (MVs). LEs are always trustful and play a role of mobile authentication server. In the beginning, the normal vehicle is authenticated only via LE. Later, if this normal vehicle is successfully authenticated, it will become a trustful vehicle. The whole process consists of 9 phases, which are initialization, registration, login, password change, general authentication, trust-extended authentication, secure communication, key revocation, and key update. When AS starts to set up the system parameters, the initiation phase will be performed. Registration has two types, namely LE registration and normal vehicle registration. In LE registration phase, a LE registers itself as a trustful vehicle with AS using a secure transmit channel. In normal vehicle registration phase, which is performed only once by per vehicle, all vehicles but LEs have to execute this phase before they enter into VANETs. User i has to execute the login phase, when it hopes to VANETs supply the best service for it. And if the User i wants to try changing its password, the password change process is started. After User i has completed its login phase, the general authentication procedure is performed between OBU i and LE j . At this time, the state of OBU i changes from mistrust to trust and gets the parameter psk (i.e., authentication key) after achieving the general authentication procedure successfully. Mistrustful OBUs can get authenticated by LEs at the general authentication phase or trusted OBU i in trust-extended authentication phase at present. Then, two trustful vehicles can have a communication at secure communication phase. When the key's lifecycle expires, the vehicle's state will become mistrustful and the key revocation will be performed. The state of the OBU i continues to be mistrustful again when the lifecycle of key expires, and the key revocation will be performed. When the key of a trustful vehicle is nearing expiration, it can update the key during the key update phase. This is the whole process of Zhou et al.'s scheme.
Each vehicle is equipped with the OBU consisting of Event Data Recorders (EDRs) and Tamper-Proof Devices (TPDs). The former are in charge of recording event data (e.g., time, location, login history of the vehicle, public parameters). The latter prevent attackers from intercepting information from OBU. Additionally, assuming that the GPS device synchronizes the time of each vehicle. The vehicle broadcasts the message with the authentication state (trusted or mistrusted) periodically. The following displays Zhou et al.'s scheme in detail.
A. INITIALIZATION
The following two steps are initialization procedures for AS when setting up system parameters. 1) Let G be an elliptic curve group, which is defined by a prime number p and a generator P. 2) The AS chooses x at random from R Z * p as its secret key and uses the one way hash chain method to calculate secure key-sets { psk i , i = 1, . . . , n }, such as,
, which is showed in Figure 2 . 
B. REGISTRATION 1) LE REGISTRATION
LE is registered with AS through a secure channel in this process. AS uses the hash-chain to calculate secure key-sets { psk i , i = 1, . . . , n }, and sends both key-sets and public parameters { G, P, p } to LE. LE stores these parameters in its reliable security hardware OBU. To ensure the robust security, the lifecycle of every psk i needs to be set shorter.
2) NORMAL VEHICLE REGISTRATION
When all vehicles enter the market, they are required to perform the procedure by means of the manufacturer or a secure channel, but LE is an exception. Each vehicle is registered only once in this process. Here are several steps of this stage:
1) User i → AS: User i selects its password pw i , then transmits its identity id i and pw i to the AS using a secure channel. 2) After receiving the identity id i and secret password pw i from User i , the AS selects y i as a random number, and then calculates
in its OBU reliable security hardware using a secure channel. 4) User i selects a number x i as its private key, and then calculates P pub i = x i P which is deemed to its public key, and then calculates z i = h(pw i ) ⊕ x i and stores both P pub i and z i in its reliable security hardware.
C. LOGIN
When a User i intends to access service from VANETs, this procedure is performed. 
E. SECURE COMMUNICATION
When two trusted OBU i and OBU j intend to have an interaction with each other, they will perform the secure communication procedure, the followings are the steps.
1) OBU i uses e i to retrieve psk = e i ⊕ h(pw i ) and uses z i
to retrieve x i = z i ⊕ h(pw i ) and calculates the message aid i = id i ⊕ h(r i P pub j ), where r i is generated randomly, If not, the request will be rejected. Otherwise, OBU j generates a random number r j and calculates: 
V. WEAKNESS OF ZHOU ET AL.'s SCHEME
In this section, we show that Zhou et al.'s scheme fails to withstand the identity guessing and the impersonation attack even the session key leaking. In particular, it cannot achieve the security requirement of resisting the identity guessing in Zhou et al.'s scheme.
A. IDENTITY GUESSING ATTACK
Here, we list the steps that the adversary guesses the user's identity.
1) Guess the value of id i to be id * i from a uniformly distributed identity dictionary D id . 2) Precisely because the open channel is exposed and unprotected on VANETs, the adversary can intercept some messages as follows: 4 , c i , y i } is intercepted from the public channel. 4) Verify the correctness of id * i by comparing h(r * i ) and h * (r i ) holds or not. 5) Repeat 1), 3), 4) until the correct value of id i is found.
Let |D id | be the size of the identity dictionary D id . As a matter of fact, |D id | is limited for users' own reasons. It is well known that users are prone to choose identities that are easier to remember for convenience, or a meaningful phrase as his/her identity in normal circumstances. Bonneau and Joseph [27] pointed out that the space of D id has a range, e.g., |D id | ≤ |D pw | ≤ 10 6 . Moreover, the procedure of the identity guessing for the adversary only requires passive guessing attack and does not involve special encryption operations. And the time complexity of the above attack procedure is O(|D id | * T H ), where T H is the execution time of the Hash function. That's to say, the time for the adversary to obtain the OBU i 's identity is a linear function of the |D id |. According to the above description, identity guessing attack is very effective for the adversary.
Assuming the correct value of id i is obtained by the adversary, user's real identity will be found. Therefore, identity guessing attack helps the adversary reveal the user's real identity id i . Hence, Zhou et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to identity guessing attack and provides weaker user anonymity.
B. SECURE SESSION KEY DISCLOSURE
As we all know, it is important that principals can prove each other's identities to realize identity authentication and then build a session key for a secure networked authentication system. The session key sk ij created between OBU i and LE j in the process of general mutual authentication can be extracted by the adversary through sk ij = h(r * i ||r * j ), where r * i and r * j are obtained from identity guessing attack phase. If the adversary finds the correct value of id i , the session key will be disclosed.
C. IMPERSONATION ATTACK
To impersonate as OBU i , the adversary should be able to access the user's associated value r i , otherwise he/she cannot obtain the valid authentication request message. For the adversary can select the random number r * i , which can also be recovered from the procedure of identity guessing attack, and obtain aid i , c i , y i from the open channel on the Internet, and he/she can compute the correct request message m 2 = h(r * i ||aid i ||c i ||y i ). Hence, [23] cannot resist an impersonation attack.
In above analysis, we have revealed that the scheme proposed by Zhou et al could not achieve certain important security requirements in our new but realistic attacking scenario.
VI. THE PROPOSED IMPROVED SCHEME
This section proposes an improved privacy protection authentication scheme to address these shortcomings of Zhou et al.'s scheme [23] in VANETs. There are also three types of vehicles in our proposed scheme, which are law executors (LEs), trusted vehicles (TVs) and mistrusted vehicles (MVs) respectively, as shown in Figure 1 . There are also nine phases in our proposed scheme: Initialization, Registration, Login, Password Change, General Authentication, Trust-Extended Authentication, Secure Communication, Key Revocation, Key Update. Table 1 shows all notations used in our scheme. In the following, we describe our proposed improved scheme in depth.
A. INITIALIZATION
This procedure mainly is used by the AS to set up the system parameters and it is as same as in Zhou et al.'s scheme.
B. REGISTRATION 1) LE REGISTRATION
This procedure is as same as in Zhou et al.'s scheme.
2) NORMAL VEHICLE REGISTRATION
Except for LE does not require this registration, all other vehicles have to be registered in this phase when they left the car factory. Each vehicle is registered only once in this process. Below we describe the normal vehicle registration while Figure 3 shows the steps. 1) A user selects its identity id i and password pw i and calculates h(pw i ). (id i , h(pw i )) are sent to the AS using a secure channel. 2) Upon receiving parameters (id i , h(pw i )) from OBU i , the AS chooses a random number y i and performs following operations: 
C. LOGIN
Vehicle users need to be verified first when they intend to get to access to service from VANETs. The details of the login phase are as followed. 
D. PASSWORD CHANGE
This procedure in our scheme is as same as in Zhou et al.'s scheme.
E. GENERAL AUTHENTICATION
When the vehicle intends to establish authentication session, the general authentication will be performed between OBU i and LE j . The steps are discussed in this part and showed in Figure 4 . 1) OBU i generates a random number r i ∈ Z * p and calculates: 
then checks h * (r j ||aid j ) is equal to h(r j ||aid j ) or not. This also can avoid a reply attack from an invalid OBU i .
F. TRUSTED-EXTENDED AUTHENTICATION
G. SECURE COMMUNICATION
Two trusted Vehicles can complete this process in the secure communication phase, the following steps are described in this part, as shown in Figure 5 . 
H. KEY REVOCATION
This procedure in our scheme is the same as the Zhou et al.'s scheme which is same as the TEAM.
I. KEY UPDATE
The key update procedure will be triggered when the TV's key lifecycle is coming to an end. The process is displayed as follows. 
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To illustrate security, the security analysis of our proposed scheme in this section will be analyzed. First, the formal security analysis is given to prove our proposed scheme is secure. Second, we apply the informal security analysis to show the feasibility of coming up with security requirements in VANETs.
A. SECURITY MODEL
The capabilities of the adversary and security requirements of the mutual authentication protocol are presented in this subsection. The security model of our proposed improved scheme is realized by the game between an adversary A and a challenger. Our security proofs adopt a random oracle model from Bellare et al. [28] . Concrete security requirements can be referred to [26] . An adversary A can be a probabilistic polynomial time machine [28] . When A gets access to all the possible oracles, which are described as below, we allow it to potentially control both the general authentication process and the secure communication process in our improved scheme. Both OBU V i and LE L i are a participant. Let U i i denote the ith instance U i , where U denotes all participants, and they all could be considered to be an oracle. Definition 1 (Adversary Abilities):
This query tests the adversary's passive attack ability. The adversary A is allowed to get access to the honest general authentication procedure and the communication procedure. This query is answered with the honest execution transcripts of the proposed protocol.
• Send(U i i , m 0 ): This query tests the adversary's active attack ability. A could transmit a message m 0 to the oracle U i i . On receiving this request message m 0 , the result and answer are returned to A by the oracle according to the proposed protocol.
• Reveal(U i i ): In this query, the oracle simulates a known key attack. The adversary A could get a session key from VOLUME 7, 2019 the oracleU i i , if the oracle has obtained a session key. Otherwise, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
• Corrupt(V i i ): In this query, the oracle simulates a violent attack. It allows the adversary A to get access to U i i 's secret information stored in the vehicle's OBU.
• Test(U i i ): This query tests the AKE security of the U i i 's session key. The adversary A could ask the oracle for the real session key at most once. On receiving this test query, the oracle outputs an unbiased bit value b. If b is equal to 1, the oracle will return the session key to A. Otherwise, it returns ⊥ to A. Definition 2 (Freshness): An instance U i i is fresh unless one of following situations occurs:
1) The Reveal-query has been sent by U i i or its partner. 2) The adversary A queries the Corrupt(V i i ) at the meantime. 3) Before U i i or its partner sent the Test-query, they had already been sent the Corrupt-query. Definition 3 (Semantic Security): Let the adversary As ability to beat our protocol be the probability of guessing the bit b got involved in the Test session. To be specific, let's define the advantage of A to be: our scheme is AKE-secure if Adv ake O2L/O2O (A) is negligibly greater than max{(q s /|D|, ε)} with q s Send-queries at the most, where |D| is the space of the password dictionary.
B. THE FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The formal security analysis under the random oracle model is given from aspects of its theorems as well as its corresponding proofs in detail. The details are displayed as follows.
Theorem 1: We define G p be the elliptic curve group, O2L be an event that the adversary A could control the general authentication procedure between OBU and LE. Let D be a password dictionary following a uniformly distributed and its size is |D|. Let 2 l be the space of the Hash Function, where l denotes the bit length of Hash values. And let A denote an adversary against the general authentication procedure of our scheme by executing at the most q e Execute-queries, q s Send-queries and q h Hash-queries. Then we have:
Proof of Theorem 1:
We demonstrate that the proposed protocol is provably secure with Exp 0 , Exp 1 , Exp 2 , Exp 3 , Exp 4 . Let Su n (1 ≤ n ≤ 4) denote the event that A successfully guesses b from the Test-query.
Experiment Exp 0 : This experiment models a real attack. According to our definition Adv ake O2L (A), we have:
Experiment Exp 1 :
All oracles Execute, Send, Reveal, Corrupt, Test in this experiment are modeled. The adversary A cannot distinguish Exp 0 and Exp 1 . Hence,
Experiment Exp 2 :
In this experiment, all oracles are also simulated. There is a collision in Exp 2 . If the collision occurs, the adversary A will initiate a reply attack to win the game. We can have the probability of collisions according to the birthday paradox. Hence,
• If there's a hash collision occurs, the probability of the collision at most is q 2 h 2 l+1 . So, only in above case can Exp 1 and Exp 2 be distinguished, and: 3 . Once the adversary A obtains the correct session key: sk = h(r i ||r j ||t l ), the invalid OBU i could extract the pre-shared key between LE and AS. However, A could do nothing with only b i , c i , d i , y i , z i and P pub i , because r i , r j is required for A to break a session key. Hence, we have a hypothesis that A has queried Corrupt(V i i ). If A intends to break the session key sk = h(r i ||r j ||t l ), it must compute r i , r j with the value a i , where a i = b i ⊕ h(pw i ). However, it is hard to recover a i without the correct password pw i . A asks Corrupt(V i i ) and guesses pw i from the dictionary D with maximum q s Send-queries. Therefore, the probability at most is q s |D| . Then we have:
Experiment Exp 4 :
Besides, we say that A succeeds the O2L of the scheme if A uses the Test(U i i ) oracle and returns the real bit guess. Thus,
Therefore, from F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 , we have:
Hence, from F 0 we will have: 
Experiment Exp 2 :
Here, all the oracles Send, Execute, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test are also modeled in this experiment. Once A gets the real identity id i of trusted OBU i , id j of trusted OBU j from the identity space, we stop simulating this guessing identity attacks.
So, Exp 2 and Exp 1 cannot be distinguished unless the case appears, and:
Experiment Exp 3 :
In this experiment, all oracles are also simulated. There exist two styles of collisions in Exp 3 . If both collisions occur, the adversary A will initiate a reply attack to win the game. We can have the probability of collisions according to the birthday paradox. Hence,
• If there's a hash collision occurs, the probability of the collision at most is So AS cannot misuse the password. 2) Anonymity, Identity Privacy-Preserving and the location privacy of user Enhancement: If the anonymity has not changed for a long time, the adversary can still steal the trajectory privacy. If the real user's identity is transmitted in plaintext form on VANETs, it can be analyzed the message easily by the attack. In our scheme, we also use XOR operation with a hash to increase the security of anonymous identity. However, the hash takes a timestamp to connect to a random as an input. We use double security parameters (random number, timestamp) to change anonymity dynamically. Above all, the adversary cannot get the user privacy by intercepting information. 3) Secure session key enhancement: Although in Zhou et al.'s scheme, the session key is diverse in different authentication or communication phase, the session key can be leaked by guessing the identity from the identity space, the explanation is described in the following 5) in detail. In our scheme, the session key is secure and also change dynamically because of the hash of the current time. The reasons of security are also demonstrated in the following 5). 4) Resistance to password guessing attack: Since there is no user password in the whole communication message, the adversary cannot obtain the user password. 5) Resistance to identity guessing and impersonation attack: Assuming D id denotes the size of the identity space, a adversary guesses a id * i from a uniformly distributed identity dictionary D id of OBU i and computes the following parameters in Zhou et al.'s scheme:
And then compares the h(r * i )? = h * (r i ), if yes, the adversary guess the id i of OBU i successfully. Next, the sk ij = h(r * i ||r * j ) also be guesses successfully by the adversary. Therefore, Zhou et al.'s scheme still has security threats. In our scheme, assuming that the adversary also guesses a id * i from the L of OBU i and computers sk ij that is generated by the hash that takes random number r i , r j as the input. r i , r j are encrypted by key a i , and a i is known by AS and trustful OBU. Therefore, our scheme can resist to identity guessing attack, but Zhou et al.'s cannot. 6) Resistance to reply attack: In our proposal, all the transmitted messages contain current time stamps, so these messages must pass the check of the time stamp freshness firstly. Therefore, a reply attack from an adversary is prevented.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. COMPUTATION COST
To demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed scheme, we analyze computation cost of the authentication and secure communication phase respectively. The following display is the performance analysis of [23] and our scheme. We analyze the computation and communication cost by contrast between our proposed scheme and [23] . These symbols T h , T m , T a respectively illustrate the execution time of shs-hash-256, scalar point multiplication and scalar addition multiplication based on ECC. These related operations are based upon the miracl c++ library [29] . In our scheme, the machine parameters are Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3337U CPU, 1.8GHz and RAM is 4GB on a Windows 10 PC. As shown in than our scheme in authentication cost, however, it cannot meet security requirements that we know about. As shown in Figure 7 , it is noteworthy that the communication cost of our scheme is far more lightweight than [23] , so our scheme yields better efficiency than previously proposed scheme in VANETs. At the same time, our scheme can resist malicious attacks which have been analyzed in section VII and shown in TABLE 5. Therefore, our scheme is a robust improvement of the privacy-preserving authentication scheme.
B. RSU SERVING CAPABILITY
When getting into the DSRC communication coverage of a LE/trusted vehicle in the area of RSU, the mistrusted vehicle will firstly build a mutual authentication with the LE/trusted vehicle. After the authentication process is finished, trusted vehicles can communicate with each other. RSU can broadcast some safety information SI , such as school zone, traffic signal, or accident zone periodically to trusted vehicles. We calculate RSU serving capability on the basis of the formula defined in [30] RSU ser = p·T com ·r s·d , where p, r, T com , s, and d respectively denote the probability for RSU to send SI messages to the trusted vehicles within its communication range r (200m), the communication time between RSU and trusted vehicles, the average speed of a trusted vehicle, the number of trusted vehicles. In our scheme, we assume that the T com is as same as between two trusted vehicles', 16T h + 2T m ≈ 6.116 ms.
As shown in Figure 8 , we can see that 8 ≤ s ≤ 10, 200 ≤ d ≤ 400. It can be observed that the performance of the RSU in our scheme is effective. RSU can generate 33 session keys and communicate with corresponding trusted vehicles for each 200 ms. We also have an observation that RSU ser is directly proportional to r and inversely proportional to the FIGURE 8. RSU serving capacity under different speed and the number of vehicles. VOLUME 7, 2019 number d and the speed s of trusted vehicles. We can calculate that a LE can authenticate about 200 mistrusted vehicles for each 200 ms due to the limit of the vehicle density, but 1111 in theory. Hence, we come to the conclusion that our scheme has lower message loss than Zhou et al.'s when the vehicle density inside the communication area enlarges.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We find that Zhou et al.'s scheme cannot achieve some of vital security requirements due to its vulnerability to identity guessing attack and impersonation attack in this paper. In addition, to overcome the weakness of Zhou et al.'s scheme, by using elliptic curves encryption technology, a new efficient privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme for secure V2V communication has been proposed by us. The security analysis suggests that this scheme can eliminate the security vulnerability of the previously proposed authentication scheme. The performance evaluation and analysis of the calculating result indicate that our proposed authentication scheme yields reasonable cost since it has lower computation and communication overhead than the previous one. Hence, our improvement is more effective and securer in the VANET environment.
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